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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years of legal developments involving children have
been marked in part by an increase in the number of major deci-
sions from the United States Supreme Court which have had a di-
rect impact on children. Some of those decisions have had a very
dramatic effect, as noted in previous surveys, such as juvenile
death penalty cases,1 cases addressing issues involving abused or
neglected children,2 an opinion defining the associational rights of
children,3 two cases further extending the rights of illegitimate
children,4 decisions addressing the educational rights of handi-
capped children,' and three important decisions narrowing the first
amendment and other expression rights of public school children.
The past year has been one of unusual activity by the Supreme
Court, both in the number of cases decided and in the complexity
and impact of the issues presented. For example, during the re-
cently concluded 1990 Term alone, the Court issued decisions in no
less than ten cases of varying importance that impact on children,
sometimes in a very profound fashion.
In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens,7 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal
Equal Access Act,8 granting greater access to the public schools for
students seeking to form religious clubs where other sectarian
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
3. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
4. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1031 (1986); Paulussen v. Her-
ion, 475 U.S. 557 (1986).
5. Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
6. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
7. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
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clubs are given access. In Missouri v. Jenkins,9 the Court approved
of broad enforcement powers for federal district courts enforcing
school desegregation orders which may include such controversial
measures as directing local governments to levy taxes to carry out
desegregation plans. In the abuse and neglect area, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting even the
possession and viewing of child pornography in one's own home in
Osborne v. Ohio.10 In Baltimore City Department of Social Ser-
vices v. Bouknight, 1 the Court rejected a claim to the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination of an allegedly abusive
mother who refused to disclose the whereabouts of her child who
had been returned to her custody pursuant to a juvenile court or-
der directing her to keep social services informed of the child's
whereabouts. In two cases handed down the last day of the 1990
Term, Idaho v. Wright 2 and Maryland v. Craig,3 the Justices ex-
panded the power of states to protect child abuse victims as wit-
nesses in subsequent court proceedings. The Court addressed is-
sues of child welfare and support under the Social Security Act in
two cases, Sullivan v. Zebley 4 and Sullivan v. Stroop.'5 Finally,
the Court once again addressed the abortion rights of pregnant,
unmarried minors in the context of two different parental notifica-
tion or parental consent statutes in Hodgson v. Minnesota6 and
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.'7
Several of these decisions will have a significant continuing im-
pact on children and adolescents and may give some forecast of the
direction that the Court will take in the future in addressing the
constitutional rights of young persons. Perhaps just as signifi-
cantly, they may herald a further acceleration in the "constitution-
alization" of the law as it relates to children.' 8
9. 110 S. Ct. 1651 reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
10. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
11. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
12. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
13. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
14. 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
15. 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990).
16. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
17. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
18. Each of the decisions noted will be discussed in considerably more detail at the appro-
priate point in this survey article.
630 [Vol. 24:629
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
II. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Abuse and Neglect
1. Judicial Developments
The disturbing number of criminal prosecutions for child abuse
and neglect continues to increase dramatically in decisions by the
Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia
alone.19 The trend is not only distressing because the reported ap-
pellate decisions represent only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg,"
but also because criminal prosecutions for child abuse represent
only a small fraction of the cases brought on the civil side of juve-
nile and domestic relations district courts for the protection of
children.
Two long awaited decisions by the United States Supreme Court
clarify somewhat the constitutional limits to the accommodations
that may be made at trial for child victims of abuse, especially the
young child sexual abuse victims. In Idaho v. Wright,20 the Court
in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice O'Connor, affirmed the Idaho
Supreme Court's reversal of a mother's criminal conviction for as-
sisting in the sexual abuse of her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter.
The conviction rested largely on the testimony of a pediatrician
who had interviewed the daughter and elicited statements about
which he testified at trial in light of the judge's finding that the
then three-year-old girl was unable to testify in court. Justice
O'Connor concluded, along with the Idaho Supreme Court, that
the admission of the evidence under the state's residual exception
19. See Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22
U. RiCH. L. REv. 691 (1988); Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 789, 796 (1987). During the past year, there were eight
published criminal appeals decisions clearly involving charges of child abuse or neglect. See
Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 384 S.E.2d 95 (1989); Frantz v. Commonwealth, 9
Va. App. 348, 388 S.E.2d 273 (1990); Morrison v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 300, 391
S.E.2d 612 (1990); Diehl v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 191, 385 S.E.2d 228 (1989); Guba v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 114, 383 S.E.2d 764 (1989); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.
App. 176, 385 S.E.2d 223 (1989); Kauffmann v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 382 S.E.2d
279 (1989); Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 382 S.E.2d 258 (1989). In one addi-
tional case an individual was charged with the abduction of an eight-year-old child but the
child escaped. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 421, 393 S.E.2d 216 (1990). One case
decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia involved a civil suit brought on the basis of sex-
ual molestation of young boys by a Scout leader. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.,
239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990).
20. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
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to the hearsay rule21 violated the Confrontation Clause of the sixth
amendment because it lacked sufficient "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. '22 Although Justice O'Connor concluded that
evidence admitted pursuant to more traditional hearsay excep-
tions, or evidence admitted in light of the presence of appropriate
factors for "trustworthiness," such as "spontaneity and constant
repetition," the "use of terminology expected of a child of similar
age," or evidence reflecting the "mental state of the declarant" or
the presence of a "lack of motive to fabricate" would sustain the
admissibility of hearsay statements "worthy of reliance at trial,"2
the difficulty in the Wright case was the trial court's dependence
on other corroborating evidence instead of a focus on the indepen-
dent reliability of the out-of-court statements. The majority opin-
ion indicated that the suggestive manner of the pre-trial interview
and other factors undermined the reliability of the hearsay evi-
dence, although it also noted that the incompetency of the declar-
ant to be a witness at trial did not impair the admissibility of her
hearsay declarations if those statements were supported by suffi-
cient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." '24 Justice
O'Connor's opinion is consistent with her earlier concurring opin-
ion in Coy v. Iowa,25 and would also seem to approve the require-
ments written into the Virginia statute concerning the admissibil-
ity of hearsay statements by a child in civil matters where, of
course, the Confrontation Clause is not an issue.26
The Court of Appeals of Virginia was likewise disturbed with the
introduction of hearsay evidence in Kauffmann v. Common-
wealth,27 a case concerning an alleged child sexual abuse victim's
statements to her friends and comments written in a diary left be-
hind after her suicide which recounted abuse by her father. The
court of appeals concluded that the hearsay evidence was not ad-
missible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule be-
cause it related only to past events. Further, the court concluded
that the statements could not come in under the "recent com-
21. IDAHO R. EvID. 803(24) (based largely on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Re-
vised Uniform Rules of Evidence).
22. 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 487 U.S. 1012, 1023-25 (1988).
26. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Cum. Supp. 1990). This section of the Code
of Virginia is also discussed in Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey
Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1988).
27. 8 Va. App. 400, 382 S.E.2d 279 (1989).
632 [Vol. 24:629
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
plaint" rule because the charge in the case was aggravated sexual
battery and the "recent complaint" rule had consistently been lim-
ited to rape and attempted rape cases.28 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit also affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief to a
state prisoner where he was convicted of the sexual assault of his
three-and-a-half-year-old daughter partly on the basis of hearsay
statements of the daughter without any contemporaneous corrobo-
ration or the necessary indicia of reliability or trustworthiness.29
A second United States Supreme Court decision, Maryland v.
Craig,30 addressed the constitutionality of a state statute permit-
ting testimony by a child abuse victim by means of closed circuit
television. The Court's decision was once again on a five to four
vote, with Justice O'Connor being the swing Justice and writing
the opinion for the Court.
Justice O'Connor concluded that the Confrontation Clause did
not require an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every crimi-
nal proceeding and, although the closed circuit television transmis-
sion was only "one way" in Maryland, by permitting the judge,
jury, and defendant to view the testifying child witness by way of a
video monitor with the child being unable to see the defendant,
the Constitution was not offended where there was a "case specific
finding of necessity."'3 Justice O'Connor quite pointedly concluded
for a Court majority "that a state's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right
to face his or her accusers in court. '3 2
In Osborne v. Ohio,33 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession of child
pornography because the interest of the state "in protecting the
victims of child pornography," described a more important interest
than that sought to be protected in the statute struck down in
Stanley v. Georgia.3 4 The Court reversed Osborne's conviction on
28. Id. at 407-09, 382 S.E.2d at 282-83.
29. Gregory v. North Carolina, 900 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1990).
30. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
31. Id. at 3171.
32. Id. at 3167. The Maryland procedure is similar to that in the Virginia statute adopted
in 1988, although the Virginia statute is more specific with regard to the particularized find-
ings that must be made. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
33. 110 S. Ct. 1691, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
34. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court in Stanley found that the primary motivation behind
the Georgia statute was a concern "that obscenity would poison the mind of its viewers." Id.
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due process grounds because of instructional error, but the broad
principle was retained.
In a case addressed by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Frantz
v. Commonwealth,3 5 the court reversed a conviction of a photogra-
pher for soliciting or encouraging children to appear in sexually
explicit visual material on the ground that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to show that the photographs in question were "sexually
explicit."
There were many other Virginia cases in the area of abuse and
neglect. In an appeal arising out of a highly publicized incident in
Virginia Beach where an adopted child was killed as a consequence
of being beaten while shackled to the floor of a converted school
bus, the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that a legal custo-
dial parent of a child may be found guilty of the felony murder of
a child with abduction as the underlying felony. 6 In another crimi-
nal child abuse case, the court of appeals reversed a conviction of a
child care provider for felony child neglect because of the failure of
the Commonwealth to comply with a discovery order.3 7 That court
also reversed some of the convictions of a minister for sexual activ-
ity involving several minor girls because of the failure of the trial
court to hold an evidentiary hearing on defense allegations of prior
sexual misconduct by some of the victims."' The court also found
the evidence of penetration sufficient to affirm a rape conviction of
a stepfather involving his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, 3  and in
another case the evidence was sufficient to establish that acts of
indecent liberties committed by an uncle against his nine-year-old
niece occurred within the time frame established in the indict-
ment.40 A first degree murder conviction of a mother for the death
of her infant daughter was reversed by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia because there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and
malice.4'
In another case that is not strictly a child abuse case, but in-
volved a trial for breaking and entering with intent to abduct an
at 565. This impinged on an individual's "right to receive information in the privacy of his
home." Id. at 564-68; see also Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695-96.
35. 9 Va. App. 348, 388 S.E.2d 273 (1990).
36. Diehl v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 191, 385 S.E.2d 228 (1989).
37. Guba v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 114, 383 S.E.2d 764 (1989).
38. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 176, 385 S.E.2d 223 (1989).
39. Morrison v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 300, 391 S.E.2d (1990).
40. Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 382 S.E.2d 258 (1989).
41. Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 376 S.E.2d 95 (1989).
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eight-year-old child, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the
admission of a pre-trial, photographic identification by the child of
the abductor despite the unnecessarily suggestive procedure where
there was sufficient "independent features of reliability" to over-
come the suggestiveness. 42 A circuit court opinion concluded that
two sexual abuse offenses involving different victims may be tried
together even though they were separated by several months where
they involved the same kind of sexual assault and the two child
victims and the defendant were members of the same household.43
Two cases illustrate the growing number of civil matters seeking
damages that are being filed arising out of sexual and other forms
of child abuse. In Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.," the
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the record supported a
finding that the Boy Scouts did not select or retain a group leader
accused of sexually abusing children in his troop. The supreme
court also addressed the trial court's error in striking the evidence
under a count alleging wilful and wanton misconduct on the part
of the abusing scoutmaster.45 In Wade v. Foreign Mission Board,46
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond indicated that a two-
year statute of limitation applied to non-contract claims of negli-
gence against an employer and that there is no common law duty
to report the sexual abuse of a child.
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,47
the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, concluded that a parent could not invoke her fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid compli-
ance with a juvenile court order directing her to produce her child
where the custody of the child was obtained pursuant to an earlier
order of that court, which directed that she comply with extensive
conditions in a "protective supervision order," including coopera-
tion with the Department of Social Services. 48 In a recent Fairfax
Circuit Court decision, the judge denied a writ of mandamus to
parties seeking to force a juvenile and domestic relations district
court judge to conduct a private hearing in a child abuse case and
42. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 421, 393 S.E.2d 216 (1990).
43. Commonwealth v. R.P., 17 Va. Cir. 52 (Fairfax County 1989).
44. 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990).
45. Id.
46. 16 Va. Cir. 61 (Richmond 1989).
47. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
48. Id. at 905.
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to prevent the parents from tape recording those proceedings.49
The court refused to issue the writ, concluding that the decisions
made were clearly within the discretion of the juvenile court judge
and could not be tested by mandamus, although the judge's discre-
tion was not without limits.
2. Legislative Developments
The Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation in its 1990
session prohibiting a prisoner from being eligible for parole unless
he has served at least twenty-five years of his sentence where the
crime was the first degree murder of a child under the age of
eight.5 0 The General Assembly also amended section 18.2-371.1 of
the Code of Virginia ("the Code"), proscribing abuse and neglect
to define "serious injury" as including disfigurement, a fracture, a
severe burn or laceration, mutilation, maiming, forced ingestion of
dangerous substances, or life-threatening internal injuries. Guardi-
ans are also included with parents as persons covered by the
section. 1
Other legislative matters in the area of abuse and neglect pro-
vided for the admissibility of medical reports in any civil child
abuse or spousal abuse case in a juvenile and domestic relations
district court.52 A further amendment to the child abuse and neg-
lect law requires the reporting by mandated persons of suspected
abuse and neglect, regardless of the identity of the persons sus-
pected of inflicting that abuse and neglect.5 3 Legislation was en-
acted permitting any person suspected of abuse or neglect who is
the subject of an investigation to tape record any conversations be-
tween the suspect and child protective services, provided notice is
given of such recording.5 4 The Attorney General is given the au-
thority to represent any guardian ad litem appointed by a court in
a civil matter for any alleged errors or admissions in the discharge
of his or her duties.5 The General Assembly followed up on its
year-long study of Court-Appointed Special Advocates ("CASA")
49. Wilcox v. Fourqurean, 17 Va. Cir. 68 (Fairfax County 1989).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(c) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
51. Id. § 18.2-371.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
52. Id. § 16.1-245.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
53. Id. § 63.1-248.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
54. Id. § 63.1-248.6:2.
55. Id. § 2.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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by establishing a state-wide CASA Program. 6 The legislation pro-
vides that the program shall be administered by the Department of
Criminal Justice Services, with the assistance of an advisory com-
mittee, to encourage the development of CASA programs around
the state to recruit and train volunteer CASA's to assist in the
handling of abuse and neglect, and other juvenile court proceed-
ings, through investigation of a case, monitoring the case, assisting
the guardian ad litem, and submitting a written report of the advo-
cates' investigation. 57 Also, the General Assembly took the unusual
step of directing the staffs of the House Appropriations Committee
and the Senate Committee on Finance to review studies over the
past five years concerning child abuse and neglect and to identify
recommendations that have been implemented, recommendations
that have not been implemented, and to prepare a fiscal impact
statement for implementation of those recommendations which
have not yet been carried through. 8
B. Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
In Wright v. Arlington County Department of Social Services,59
the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that the burden of proof in
a civil child abuse or neglect proceeding for the purpose of ob-
taining temporary custody of children is preponderance of the evi-
dence. This has long been thought to be the standard of proof in
those abuse and neglect proceedings short of termination of
residual parental rights, but the Wright decision reinforces that
perception. In Vosburg v. Department of Social Services, ° the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with the more diffi-
cult issue of whether a social worker enjoys immunity in filing a
petition for the removal of allegedly abused or neglected children
from their parents. The court concluded that immunity attaches
and that the appropriate type of immunity was absolute and com-
parable to that applying to prosecutors initiating and pursuing
criminal prosecutions61 In Weller v. Department of Social Ser-
56. Id. §§ 2.1-121, 9-173.6 to 173.13, 16.1-274 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
57. Id. § 9-173.8 (Cum. Supp. 1990). '
58. S.J. Res. 86, Va. General Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
59. 9 Va. App. 411, 388 S.E.2d 477 (1990).
60. 884 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 135. The court left open the question of the immunity that applies to conduct
regarding a child once a removal has taken place since the plaintiffs in this case did not
appeal the district court's conclusion that absolute immunity applied to that conduct as
well. Id. at 138.
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vices for the City of Baltimore,62 the appellate court reversed in
part the decision of the district court dismissing a father's pro se
complaint, at least insofar as the pleading alleged a denial of due
process in failing to provide a hearing to the father before placing
custody of his son with the boy's grandmother and Weller's ex-
wife. The court reserved judgment on what process was due but
concluded that "the private, fundamental liberty interest involved
in retaining the custody of one's child and the integrity of one's
family is of the greatest importance."6
Partially in recognition of the fundamental interests implicated
by the family relationship, the General Assembly amended the
purpose and intent clause of the juvenile and domestic relations
district court law to reinforce the state policy against breaking up
the family by providing that a child should be separated from his
or her normal family only when the child's welfare is endangered
or in the interest of public safety and then "only after considera-
tion of alternatives to out-of-home placement which afford effec-
tive protection to the child, his family, and the community. '64 The
legislature also provided that when a juvenile and domestic rela-
tions district court determines the placement of legal custody, par-
ticularly with a public agency, the party with legal custody need
not return to court for a redetermination of where and with whom
a child shall live.6 5 The legislation also provides that when a dispo-
sitional order is entered in the case of an abused or neglected child
prohibiting or limiting contact between the child and his or her
own parents or guardians, that order is not only effective for a
maximum of 180 days, but after a hearing prior to the end of that
initial period, a new order may limit or prohibit contact for an ad-
ditional 180 days.6
III. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
A. Juvenile Delinquency
The developments in the delinquency area this year in Virginia
were all legislative, as there were no reported appellate decisions.
The definition of a delinquent act was amended to include a re-
62. 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 394.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227(3) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
65. Id. §§ 16.1-228, -251, -252.
66. Id. § 16.1-279(A)(2a).
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fusal to take a blood or breath test and an expanded statutory
scheme was devised to deal with the disposition of such juveniles.67
Two bills expanded the category of offenses for which a child may
be taken into immediate custody without a detention order or a
warrant where the offense was not committed in the presence of
the officer but the arrest was based on probable cause. These of-
fenses include assault and battery and carrying a weapon on school
property. A detention order may be issued for a juvenile who has
absconded from a detention home or other facility by either the
committing judge or a judge in the jurisdiction where the juvenile
is taken into custody." Persistent problems involving the transpor-
tation of juveniles were addressed in bills that provide that a juve-
nile court staff or the staff of a detention home are responsible for
certain forms of transportation for youths subject to court orders
pursuant to state-developed guidelines. The limitation on the use
of police patrol wagons previously found in the juvenile code was
deleted.70 The legislature also provided that a proceeding may be
initiated by a summons rather than a petition in connection with
driving while intoxicated.7 1 In the transfer section of the juvenile
code, the legislature institutionalized the juvenile's right to appeal
to the circuit court a decision by the juvenile court to transfer the
juvenile for trial as an adult. However, re-examination of the juve-
nile court's probable cause decision is precluded.7 2 This statutory
amendment embodies in the juvenile code the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia concluding that a juvenile has the
right to a review of the transfer decision in the circuit court in the
cases of Grogg v. Commonwealth 3 and Hairfield v. Common-
wealth.7 4 The General Assembly clarified its 1989 legislation pro-
viding for trial and treatment as an adult of a juvenile who has
been previously tried and convicted as an adult and sentenced to
an adult facility who commits a criminal act while confined in that
adult facility.7 5 The 1990 session also clarified the right of a juve-
nile court judge to punish for contempt and to utilize the jail for
punishment for contempt where a former juvenile has become an
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228, -279(E)(Cum. Supp. 1990).
68. Id. § 16.1-246(C)(1).
69. Id. § 16.1-248.1.
70. Id. § 16.1-254 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
71. Id. § 16.1-260 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
72. Id. § 16.1-269.
73. 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).
74. 7 Va. App. 649, 376 S.E.2d 796 (1989).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
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adult in the interim.7 16 Another bill deals with the docketing and
handling of records in juvenile cases when appealed to circuit
courts or in connection with the expungement of certain records in
the juvenile court.77 The General Assembly developed a Commu-
nity Prevention Initiative Grants Program to deal with "at risk"
youths. 8 The legislature also extensively revised the sections of the
Code dealing with youthful offender programs. 79 Several bills were
also adopted amending section 18.2-255 of the Code dealing with
the distribution of drugs to minors and in recruiting minors to as-
sist in the distribution of imitation controlled substances."0
B. Noncriminal Misbehavior
The General Assembly corrected an oversight noted in this sur-
vey last year ' by creating a new jurisdictional category of "status
offense" which constitutes "an act prohibited by law which would
not be an offense if committed by an adult."82 Jurisdiction over
such a matter is placed in the juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court, and the range of dispositional orders that may be en-
tered is the same as that for a "child in need of services" pursuant
to section 16.1-279(C) of the Code. 3 The principal matters that
would likely be included in this new category would be violations
of local curfew ordinances and violations of a prescription against
purchase or possession of tobacco products by a person younger
than sixteen. 4
76. Id. § 16.1-292(A).
77. Id. §§ 8.01-231, 16.1-69.55, -305, -307, 17-27, 19.2-240 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
78. Id. §§ 9-272 to -272.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
79. Id. §§ 19.2-311, -316, 53.1-63, -64, -66, -67 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
80. Id. § 18.2-255 (Cum. Supp. 1990). In Pannell v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 170, 384
S.E.2d 344 (1989), the court held that for a conviction of distribution of drugs to a minor,
there need be no showing that the defendant knew that the person to whom the drugs were
distributed was under the age of eighteen.
81. Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U.
RicH. L. REv. 705, 715-18, n.77 (1989).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
83. Id. §§ 16.1-241, 279(C)(2).
84. Id. § 18.2-371.2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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IV. CHILD CUSTODY AND ADOPTION
A. Child Custody
In Mason v. Moon,85 the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded
that the action of a mother in signing an amended separation
agreement giving her husband primary custody of her child did not
constitute the "voluntary relinquishment of custody" that will re-
but the presumption favoring a natural parent over a nonparent.
The custody dispute in the case was between the natural mother
and the paternal grandmother following the self-defense killing of
the natural father by the mother's boyfriend, who had become her
husband by the time of the custody dispute. The trial court had
concluded that the mother's execution of the amended separation
agreement constituted the relinquishment of custody that would
negate the presumption in her favor and that the possible psycho-
logical harm to the daughter of being in the household of the man
who had killed her father was an "extraordinary circumstance"
justifying the award of custody to a nonparent. The court of ap-
peals disagreed, concluding in part that the "voluntary relinquish-
ment" contemplated by the rule did not include a custody agree-
ment between separating or divorcing spouses. 8 6 In the absence of
any factor undermining the presumption in favor of a natural par-
ent, the evidence was insufficient to place custody with the pater-
nal grandmother.
The General Assembly again amended section 16.1-244 of the
Code relating to concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and cir-
cuit courts over custody, visitation and support matters involving
children or a spouse. This amendment provides that the juvenile
court is divested of jurisdiction over a matter when a suit for di-
vorce is filed in the circuit court in which issues of custody, guardi-
anship, visitation, or support of the children or spousal support is
"raised by the pleadings and a hearing is set by the circuit court on
any such issue for a date certain to be heard within twenty-one
days of the filing. '87 Two recently reported circuit court opinions
conclude that the best interests of the child in custody suits are
paramount, and that the stability of the home environment and
the child's need for continuity of relationships are important con-
85. 9 Va. App. 217, 385 S.E.2d 242 (1989).
86. Id. at 222, 385 S.E.2d at 245.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-244 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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siderations in this best interests formula.8 The award of custody
of a child who is the natural child of both parties to the father
where the mother was found to be "socially and morally irresponsi-
ble" is not inconsistent with awarding custody of his stepchild to
her mother because of the different standards that apply in con-
tests between a natural parent and a third party. 9
In Farley v. Farley,90 the court of appeals ruled that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in transferring jurisdiction over a
child custody and visitation dispute to a South Carolina court
where that state was the "home state" of the children and where
there was adverse media publicity in Virginia because of allega-
tions of child sexual abuse. The court found that the allegations of
child sexual abuse could be adequately investigated and handled
by the courts and social services in South Carolina. In Hutt v.
Hutt,9 a Virginia circuit court retained jurisdiction over custody
and dispute matters involving a minor child who was removed by
the mother to the Virgin Islands because of the court's concern
about actions of the mother in connection with the litigation in
both Virginia and in the newly-filed proceedings in the Virgin Is-
lands. In Schuelke v. Schuelke,92 the court refused to issue an in-
junction to prevent a custodial parent from making an in-state
move with the children, distinguishing earlier cases regarding the
power to issue injunctions for out-of-state moves. 3
B. Adoption
In Linkous v. Kingery,94 the Court of Appeals of Virginia con-
cluded that a natural father, who was incarcerated in the peniten-
tiary, had withheld his consent to adoption of his children by their
stepfather contrary to the best interests of the children. In that
case, the natural father had been a marginal parental figure prior
to his criminal convictions, and he was serving a prolonged period
of incarceration for serious felonies. In the interim, the stepfather
had created a strongly-bonded family with the children, among
88. Hodge v. Hodge, 16 Va. Cir. 510 (Bath County 1982).
89. Collins v. Collins, 16 Va. Cir. 90 (Frederick County 1989).
90. 9 Va. App. 325, 387 S.E.2d 794 (1990).
91. 16 Va. Cir. 320 (Frederick County 1989).
92. 17 Va. Cir. 281 (Chesterfield County 1989).
93. See, e.g., Scinaldi v. Scinaldi, 2 Va. App. 571, 347 S.E.2d 149 (1986); Simmons v.
Simmons, 1 Va. App. 358, 339 S.E.2d 198 (1986).
94. 10 Va. App. 45, 390 S.E.2d 188 (1990).
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other important factors. Consequently, the adoption was ordered
over the objection of the natural father.9 5 In a circuit court adop-
tion proceeding, the court concluded that procedural deficiencies
in the earlier juvenile court proceeding concerning custody of two
children did not foreclose consideration of an adoption by the cir-
cuit court where all of the procedural safeguards would be
afforded. 6
The General Assembly enacted legislation providing that where
a licensed child-placing agency or local department of social ser-
vices accepts custody of a child for placement with adoptive par-
ents designated by the birth parents or a person other than a li-
censed child-pracing agency or local board of public welfare, then
the procedures outlined in section 63.1-220.3 of the Code regarding
judicial approval of consent would apply to that placement.9 7 The
legislature also provided that fees for adoption services, including
home studies, are to be paid to the Department of Social Services
and a receipt is to be provided to the court prior to the acceptance
of parental consent or entry of any final adoption order.98
V. PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in an intestate succession
case that a 1953 Pennsylvania child support order which was never
appealed, ordering the decedent to support his two illegitimate
children, was res judicata, and the issue of paternity could not be
relitigated in Virginia.9 In a circuit court decision, it was con-
cluded that the defendant in an appeal from a juvenile court's
child support decree could seek blood grouping tests to establish
his nonpaternity, and the court ordered such tests to be con-
ducted. 100 The General Assembly enacted legislation allowing a
court to make an equitable apportionment of living expenses in-
curred on behalf of a child from the date notice of parentage pro-
ceedings was given to the alleged parent. The court's judgment or-
der may be in favor of the natural parent or any other person or
agency who incurred the expenses.'
95. Id. at 59-60, 360 S.E.2d at 196.
96. In re Tabb, 18 Va. Cir. 355 (Chesterfield County 1989).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
98. Id. § 63.1-236.1.
99. Hupp v. Hupp, 239 Va. 494, 391 S.E.2d 329 (1990).
100. Bryant v. Bryant, 17 Va. Cir. 293 (Chesterfield County 1989).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.8 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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VI. CHILD SUPPORT
Two United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the So-
cial Security Act will have quite different impacts on low income
and disabled children. In Sullivan v. Zebley,10 2 the Court held that
regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices violated the Social Security Act in that the regulations af-
forded less relief to disabled children than to disabled adults. For
adults, the regulatory scheme had a five-step approach for estab-
lishing disability while a child had no opportunity to utilize the
fourth or fifth steps, and thus the regulations violated the Act. The
Act itself sought to authorize the payment of Supplemental Secur-
ity Income ("SSI") benefits to children who suffered a disability of
"comparable severity" to one that would impair an adult. However,
in Sullivan v. Stroop,'10 the Court concluded that insurance bene-
fits received by a child under the Social Security Act did not con-
stitute "child support payments," for which the first fifty dollars
was disregarded in establishing benefits under the Aid to Family
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program. The term "child
support" as used in the Act was obviously intended, in the view of
the majority of the Court, to be limited to support payments made
by absent parents.
In Duke v. Duke,04 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that a pendente lite order to pay spousal and child support re-
mained in effect after the entry of a final divorce decree which ex-
plicitly reserved jurisdiction over support. The deceased husband's
real estate could be subjected to the payment of support arrearages
under the pendente lite order. °5 In Schoenwetter v. Schoenwet-
ter,1°0 the Court of Appeals of Virginia also ruled that since a di-
vorce case in which a final decree had been entered was improperly
discontinued by the circuit court, the circuit court subsequently
had the power to modify spousal and child support to increase the
husband's obligations. In Cutlipp v. Cutlipp,07 the court of ap-
peals concluded that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to order
child support for a daughter who had reached eighteen at the time
of the trial court's decree, absent a contrary agreement between
102. 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
103. 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990).
104. 239 Va. 501, 391 S.E.2d 77 (1990).
105. Id. at 504-05, 391 S.E.2d at 78-79.
106. 8 Va. App. 601, 383 S.E.2d 28 (1989).
107. 8 Va. App. 618, 383 S.E.2d 273 (1989).
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the parents. In Ware v. Ware,"'8 the court of appeals also con-
cluded that a daughter had become "otherwise emancipated"
within the meaning of a property settlement agreement when she
became employed on a full-time basis with the knowledge and con-
sent of her mother with whom she continued to live, even though
she had not reached her twenty-first birthday, to which the obliga-
tion of support continued under the agreement. The court stated
that the phrase "otherwise emancipated" was meant "to contem-
plate any act of emancipation recognized in law.' 0
9
Another court of appeals decision that is sure to have a signifi-
cant impact on court jurisdiction is Scheer v. Isaacs,10 wherein the
court concluded that an appeal by an ex-husband from a judgment
in favor of the ex-wife for child support arrearages from the juve-
nile and domestic relations district court to the circuit court was
invalidated by the failure of the ex-husband to post an appeal
bond. The court concluded that section 16.1-107 of the Code
clearly provides for a bond in the appeal of any civil case from a
court not of record and that juvenile and domestic district courts
are clearly courts not of record."' Consequently, such a bond must
be filed to give a circuit court jurisdiction over the appeal of any
"civil case." Many proceedings in juvenile and domestic relations
district courts are characterized as "civil," and it is uncertain
whether the Scheer holding is intended to apply to all of them, or
only to require appeal bonds for those matters where the juvenile
court's order involves a money judgment or something comparable.
It seems unlikely that the court intended the holding to apply to
appeals from abuse and neglect adjudications or other non-delin-
quency proceedings, yet the language of the opinion does not spe-
cifically negate such a conclusion.
In circuit courts across the state, there have been many cases in
the child support area. The courts have held that a court order
requiring a party to submit to a blood test is not a final order for
the purposes of appeal." 2 A court has no authority to relieve a de-
linquent spouse of the obligation to pay accrued installments of
child support, but that such arrearages can be ordered to be paid
108. 10 Va. App. 352, 391 S.E.2d 887 (1990).
109. Id. at 354, 391 S.E.2d at 888.
110. 10 Va. App. 338, 392 S.E.2d 201 (1990).
111. Id. at 341, 392 S.E.2d at 202.
112. Commonwealth v. F.F., 16 Va. Cir. 14 (Wise County 1988).
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in installments.1 3 Marital settlement agreements between divorc-
ing parents cannot divest the courts of their jurisdiction to enter or
modify child support decrees." 4 A juvenile and domestic relations
district court has the authority to enforce its support judgments by
ordering payroll deductions. 15 Juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to modify foreign
decrees for child support." 6 Social Security disability benefits paid
to a child are to be credited towards a parent's child support pay-
ments and even accrued arrearages. 17 The Division of Child Sup-
port Enforcement of the Virginia Department of Social Services
cannot act on behalf of a child who is not a resident of Virginia."'
The provision of notice and hearing requirements prior to the col-
lection of child support arrearages satisfies the requirements of due
process, even though the initial establishment of the obligation for
child support was without such notice." 9
On the legislative front, the General Assembly provided that pa-
ternity established by genetic blood testing which affirms at least a
ninety-eight percent probability of paternity would have the same
effect as a judgment of paternity.120 The General Assembly also
made other procedural changes in the child support enforcement
system, such as a requirement to report Social Security account
numbers at the time of a child's birth.'2 ' Legislation clarified a fac-
tor for the provision of child support in connection with the impu-
tation of income to a party who is voluntarily unemployed or un-
deremployed. 122 The amendment changed to the conjunctive the
factor that this income may not be imputed "when a child is not in
school, child care services are not available, and the cost of such
child care services are not included in the computation;" rather
than the prior apparent disjunctive where the imputation would
not take place "when a child is not in school or where child care
services are not available and the cost of such child care services
are not included in the computation.'2 The legislature also pro-
113. Maitland v. Miller, 15 Va. Cir. 292 (Prince George County 1989).
114. Bower v. Lawhorne, 15 Va. Cir. 368 (Frederick County 1989).
115. Hartsook v. Hartsook, 17 Va. Cir. 248 (Chesterfield County 1989).
116. Commonwealth v. Giunta, 17 Va. Cir. 1 (Fairfax County 1988).
117. Commonwealth v. Beavers, 16 Va. Cir. 378 (Wise County 1989).
118. Foondle v. Sherry, 16 Va. Cir. 396 (Alexandria 1989).
119. Commonwealth v. Broadnax, 18 Va. Cir. 276 (Richmond 1989).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
121. Id. at §§ 20 -60.5, -79.2, 32.1-261.1, and 63.1-250.1.
122. Id. § 20-108.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
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vided that workers' compensation payments shall be subject to
"claims for spousal and child support subject to the same exemp-
tions allowed for earnings in § 34-29. "124
VII. EDUCATION
Two significant decisions were handed down by the United
States Supreme Court during the 1989 Term, both dealing with
continuing controversies-the enforcement of school desegregation
orders and religious activities in the schools. In Missouri v. Jen-
kins,125 the Supreme Court upheld the power of a federal district
court to enjoin state laws restricting local school districts in their
power to raise revenues where such restrictions interfere with the
ability of a school district to implement court-ordered school de-
segregation plans. The Court concluded in Jenkins that the dis-
trict court had violated principles of comity by imposing a local
property tax increase before considering the less intrusive remedy
of enjoining the restrictive state laws and leaving the means of
raising the revenues up to the local governmental authorities. 26 In
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens,127 the Court held that the Equal Access Act 28 does not
violate the Establishment Clause of the first amendment by per-
mitting the recognition of student religious groups and allowing
them to meet on school premises during noninstructional time
when other noncurriculum-related student groups are also permit-
ted to meet. The phrase "noncurriculum-related student groups"
must be interpreted broadly, and when a school allows such an or-
ganization to meet on school premises, it must not discriminate
against other students who wish to conduct meetings for religious
purposes without involvement by the school authorities.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Seemuller v.
Fairfax County School Board,29 dealt with first amendment rights
of teachers, and it concluded that a physical education teacher's
letter to the school newspaper which attempted in a satirical fash-
ion to address complaints of sexual discrimination that had previ-
ously appeared in the same publication was protected speech. The
124. Id. § 65.1-82 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
125. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
126. Id. at 1663.
127. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
128. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
129. 878 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir. 1989).
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teacher subsequently received a re-evaluation which prevented him
from receiving his step increment in pay, and the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the teacher that his letter addressed a matter of public
concern and thus was protected by the first amendment, rather
than simply constituting a personal response to criticism. The
Fourth Circuit also continued its somewhat narrow interpretation
of the Education of the Handicapped Act'30 by concluding in one
case that where a due process hearing officer and review officer's
conclusions are in conflict, the district court need not defer to the
review officer, and that the local school board was not obligated to
provide habilitative services outside of the school day that were
related more to behavior management than to the educational
program. 131
In Shook v. Gaston County Board of Education,132 the Fourth
Circuit determined that an educationally handicapped child was
entitled to reimbursement of expenses paid for by a special insur-
ance program provided to her father by his employer. The school
board was bound to provide the amounts expended for private ed-
ucation since these expenses depleted the total amount provided
for under the policy.133 The court also concluded that a school sys-
tem that placed an autistic child in a special school program,
rather than "mainstreaming" him at the nearest high school, did
not violate the Act because of evidence that an appropriate pro-
gram could not be provided for him at the closest school.13
The General Assembly adopted a far-reaching statutory program
for addressing the problems of school dropout and the delivery of
services to children who are at risk and their parents. 35 The statu-
tory scheme enacted does not become effective until July 1, 1992.
The legislature also passed several bills addressing the sale, or pos-
session for sale, of controlled substances13 6 or firearms or other
weapons,'13 7 or dealing with intoxicated persons' 38 all on school
130. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
131. Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
132. 882 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 122.
134. Devries v. Fairfax County School Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
135. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-279 (Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 18.2-371 (Cum. Supp. 1990);
id.§§ 22.1-17.1, -209, -209.1:1, -252.13:1, -254, -258, -262, -263, -265, -267, -274, -279.2, -280.1,
-289, -344 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
136. Id. § 18.2-255.2.
137. Id. §§ 16.1-246, 18.2-308.1, and 19.2-81.
138. Id. § 18.2-415.
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property. A bill was also enacted requiring certain criminal acts
and violent behavior to be reported to a school principal or his
designee, 13 and also authorizing a school board to require any stu-
dent who has been found guilty of a crime which resulted in or
could have resulted in injuries to others to attend an alternative
education program instead of being involved in regular school
services.1
41
VIII. MENTAL HEALTH
The 1990 legislative session witnessed the culmination of an ef-
fort over a number of years to adopt a new and comprehensive
statutory scheme for dealing with the commitment of mentally ill
minors to psychiatric hospitals. The result, known as "The Psychi-
atric Inpatient Treatment of Minors Act", moves the relevant
Code sections from title 37.1 of the Code dealing with mental
health to title 16.1 of the Code where they become part of the juve-
nile code.1 4 ' The legislation defines mental illness as "a substantial
disorder of the minor's cognitive, volitional, or emotional processes
that demonstrably and significantly impairs judgment or capacity
to recognize reality or to control behavior," and it also includes
"substance abuse" which is the "use, without compelling medical
reason, of any substance which results in psychological or physio-
logical dependency as a function of continued use in such manner
as to induce mental, emotional, or physical impairment and cause
socially dysfunctional or socially disordering behavior.' 1 42 The leg-
islation then defines three categories of mentally ill children: (1) a
minor younger than fourteen years of age who may be admitted to
a willing mental health facility with the consent of a custodial par-
ent and a minor fourteen years of age or older admitted to such a
facility with the consent of the minor and the parent;143 (2) a mi-
nor fourteen years of age or older who objects to admission to a
willing facility for up to seventy-two hours upon the application of
a custodial parent;144 and (3) a minor who is involuntarily commit-
ted to a mental health facility by a petition filed in the juvenile
139. Id. §§ 22.1-65, -280.1.
140. Id. § 22.1-277.1.
141. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335, to -348 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
142. Id. § 16.1-336.
143. Id. § 16.1-338.
144. Id. § 16.1-339.
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and domestic relations district court by a parent or by any respon-
sible adult.14
5
The minor who is subjected to an involuntary commitment is
afforded significant procedural protections by the Act, including
the appointnient of an attorney who is directed to perform certain
specific duties prior to the hearing,146 and the right to have a
clinical evaluation by a qualified evaluator arranged by the com-
munity services board who is not and will not be treating the mi-
nor and has no significant financial interest in the facility to which
the minor would be committed. 147 The Act defines a qualified
evaluator as a psychiatrist or psychologist licensed in Virginia,
skilled in diagnosis and treatment of mental illness in minors, or a
mental health professional licensed in Virginia or employed by a
community services board. 48 The Act further describes certain
minimal due process requirements for an involuntary commitment
hearing,149 and defines precise and demanding criteria for the in-
voluntary commitment of a minor to a mental health facility. 50
After a commitment order has been entered by the court, an indi-
vidualized treatment plan must be prepared with the involvement
of the minor and the minor's family that includes a provision for a
periodic review of the minor's status "by appropriate hospital med-
ical staff review. ''51 The most troublesome aspect of the legislation
is its failure to require a pre-admission evaluation of younger chil-
dren, of consenting minors fourteen years of age or older, and of
objecting minors who are committed by their parents, prior to the
loss of liberty involved by placement in the hospital. 152 The Act
does require that an objecting minor fourteen years of age or older
must be examined by a qualified evaluator within twenty-four
hours of admission and that the facility must file a petition for
judicial approval of the admission with the juvenile and domestic
relations district court for the jurisdiction in which the facility is
located.' A major concern presented by the ability to place or ad-
mit a child to a psychiatric hospital without a prior evaluation by a
145. Id. § 16.1-341.
146. Id. § 16.1-343.
147. Id. § 16.1-342.
148. Id. § 16.1-336.
149. Id. § 16.1-344.
150. Id. § 16.1-345.
151. Id. § 16.1-346.
152. Id. § 16.1-338.
153. Id. § 16.1-338 to -339.
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"qualified evaluator" is the growing concern around the nation
about the dramatic increase in the number of commitments of
"troubled youth" to private psychiatric hospitals, especially in
light of aggressive advertising campaigns in the media by such fa-
cilities.15 4 An additional problem in the Act is some inconsistency
in the language regarding the necessity for hearings before a judge
of the juvenile and domestic relations district court or before a
special justice pursuant to section 37.1-88 of the Code. 5 ' Section
37.1-67.1 of the Code, as amended in 1990, allows for the place-
ment of a child, as well as other individuals, suspected to be men-
tally ill in a hospital pursuant to a temporary detention order, but
only after a prior evaluation by a "person skilled in the diagnosis
and treatment of mental illness."' 56 The 1990 Act marks a signifi-
cant improvement in the procedures for the commitment of chil-
dren to psychiatric hospitals with the few, but possibly major, defi-
ciencies noted in this discussion.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
The most significant developments in the United States Su-
preme Court involving children, other than those already de-
scribed, were the two cases decided the last week of the October
1989 Term concerning parental consent to an abortion, and notifi-
cation of a minor daughter's intention to have an abortion. In
Hodgson v. Minnesota,157 a deeply divided and fragmented Su-
preme Court concluded that the Minnesota statute requiring that a
pregnant woman under eighteen years of age could not have the
pregnancy aborted until at least forty-eight hours had passed after
notification of both of her parents was unconstitutional. However,
the same statute also provided that if the two-parent notification
provision were enjoined, then a procedure would go into effect that
would require notification of both parents or allow bypass of that
requirement through a judicial proceeding in which a court may
conclude that the minor is mature or that parental notification is
not in her best interest. This latter provision saved the entire stat-
154. See, e.g., Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1988); Jackson-Beeck, Schwartz &
Rutherford, Trends and Issues in Juvenile Confinement for Psychiatric and Chemical De-
pendency Treatment, 10 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 153 (1987).
155. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, -339, -341, -348 (Cum. Supp. 1990); id. §§ 37.1-1
(Cum. Supp. 1990).
156. Id. § 37.1-67.1.
157. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
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utory scheme from unconstitutionality, in the judgment of the
Court. Similarly, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,'5 8 the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio stat-
ute making it criminal for a physician to perform an abortion on
an unmarried, unemancipated woman under eighteen unless (1)
one parent has consented in writing, (2) the physician has given
notice to one parent or guardian, or (3) a court has authorized the
abortion based on a finding that the woman is sufficiently mature
and intelligent to have an abortion without parental notice, that
the parent has abused her or that the notice is not in her best
interest, or (4) if a court by its inaction has constructively author-
ized the abortion. 59 The Court also upheld the procedural aspects
of the statute even though-the judicial procedures did not guaran-
tee complete anonymity and there was a possibility that the court
proceedings might require up to twenty-two days for completion.
Closure was finally achieved in the long-running case of Ameri-
can Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Virginia, 60 when the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's
statute'6 prohibiting the sale of sexually explicit materials to
juveniles in light of the interpretation of that statute by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court. 62 The Virginia Supreme Court also con-
cluded that an action for the wrongful death of a child could be
maintained against a motorist whose negligence occurred when the
child was a fetus so long as the child was born alive and suffered
from the effects of the injury, even where the child subsequently
died.' A Virginia circuit court also held that parents were not
bound by a contract agreeing to pay for damages to property
caused by the vandalism of their children because such contract
was not supported by consideration in the absence of the parents'
tort liability for such actions.' Another circuit court concluded
that a motorist who killed an infant child crossing a public high-
way could not sue the parents for exoneration or contribution on a
theory of negligent supervision.'"e The General Assembly amended
158. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
159. Id. at 2977.
160. 882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1525 (1990).
161. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-390, -391 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
162. See Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 236 Va. 168, 372 S.E.2d 618
(1988).
163. Kalafut v. Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 389 S.E.2d 681 (1990).
164. Poe v. Yanke, 16 Va. Cir. 202 (Frederick County 1989).
165. Harrison v. Shelton, 17 Va. Cir. 210 (Northumberland County 1989).
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the emancipation statute to preclude an emancipated child from
being found in need of supervision or in violation of a curfew ordi-
nance, and that legislation also provides for the issuance of eman-
cipation identification cards by the Department of Motor
Vehicles.' 66
166. V& CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-334, 334.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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